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Development of a Model of Group Cognitive 
Complexity: A Combined View of a Group 





Drawing on the input-process-output model (Hackman 1987), this study 
attempts to integrate two different perspectives on group-level cognition: 
a compositional and a group-as-a-whole perspective. A compositional 
perspective focuses on individual member cognitions and then examines 
how cognitions of group members combine to produce group-level cognition. 
In contrast, a group-as-a-whole perspective views group cognition as an 
emergent quality resulting from group interactions. Using the concept 
of cognitive complexity, this study explores some aspects of group 
compositions as a cause for an emergent property of group cognitive 
complexity, which in turn affects group decision-making effectiveness. This 
study introduces a causal mapping combined with a group discussion 
method as a useful tool to measure group cognitive complexity as a 
collective phenomenon. 
Keywords: Group Cognitive Complexity, Group Composition, Causal Maps
INTRODUCTION
Increased competitive pressures and technology advancements 
have led current organizations to use work groups or teams widely 
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in their functions (Sundstrom et al. 2000). Modern tasks are no 
longer simple and repetitive as in the past. Many tasks are often 
complicated and complex so that an individual alone cannot manage 
them successfully. The use of work groups has become popular 
as a solution to the growing complexity of tasks. However, many 
group works still involve a variety of cognitive tasks (e.g., problem 
solving, judgment, inference, and decision-making) and additionally 
entail new forms of cognitive requirement such as pooling and 
coordinating resources or inputs of individual members (Cooke et 
al. 2003). Therefore, the understanding of group-level cognition 
has gained importance to better understand group behaviors. In 
particular, scholars of managerial and organization cognition direct 
their interests toward analysis of collective information processing to 
explain performance differences between work groups. 
In general, in a given decision-making context, effective decision-
making cannot be made without an adequate amount of information 
(Kiesler and Spoull 1982). Therefore, the particular way in which a 
group searches for and handles information is of great importance 
in developing a model for effective group decision-making. To be 
effective decision-makers (both individuals and groups), some 
scholars have acknowledged the importance of “complicated 
understanding” (or cognitive complexity), in which organizational 
problems are seen from multiple perspectives (Bartunek, Gordon, 
and Weathersby 1983; Weick 1979). The concept of cognitive 
complexity was originally developed to describe the information-
processing characteristics of individuals (Driver 1987). By applying 
this concept to the group level, this study developed a theoretical 
model of group cognitive complexity. In developing the model, the 
present study combines two different approaches on group-level 
cognitive complexity: A compositional and a group-as-a-whole 
approach. These two approaches have been applied to understand 
group-level cognition in general (e.g., group efficacy, group cognitive 
ability, and so on). 
The compositional approach basically focuses on individual 
cognition and then examines how cognitions of individual group 
members combine to produce group-level cognition. This approach 
views that a human is a mental entity capable of thought but that 
groups do not literally think. Therefore, group cognition can only be 
characterized meaningfully by studying the attributes of individual 
members (Gioia and Sims 1986). Herein, one important assumption 
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is that individual members are the fundamental element of a 
group. The cognitive resources of individual members can, in 
aggregate, influence the group (Walsh and Ungson 1991). Based on 
this idea, composition researchers have largely studied individual 
characteristics of group members as major factors that explain 
performance differences across groups (Bantel and Jackson 1989; 
Tziner and Eden 1985).
In contrast, some of the more recent authors subscribing to the 
group-as-a-whole approach begin to claim “the existence of collective 
mind” (Neck and Manz 1994; Weick and Roberts 1993); that is, a 
group can be regarded as a social entity capable of thought, much 
like an individual. This perspective maintains that group cognition 
is more than a simple collection of individual member cognitions, 
and that it cannot be characterized by studying individual members 
alone. Instead, the group-as-a-whole perspective views group 
cognition as an emergent product of social interactions.
While both approaches presume that group cognition is an 
important determinant of group effectiveness, they differ in 
conceptualizing the group cognition constructs by focusing on a 
different target. Specifically, while the compositional approach 
targets the cognitions of individual group members, the group-as-
a-whole approach focuses on an emergent product of collective 
cognition resulting from social interactions. Conceptually, the 
group-as-a-whole approach is more compelling compared with 
the compositional approach. The main reason for this is that the 
former approach is able to approximate the interactive processes 
that are important during group task performance. However, the 
compositional approach underestimates the interactional processes 
among group members who possess different (or similar) attributes.
Although these two approaches differ in terms of conceptualization 
of group cognition, it does not necessarily mean that the two 
approaches are competitive in nature. Rather, the two approaches 
can be used together as a means to understand the phenomena of 
group cognition better. The input-process-output model (Hackman 
1987) can serve as the basis for linking the two approaches and 
their relations to group outcomes. This input-process-output 
model posits that various inputs (e.g., member attributes, task 
characteristics, and structural characteristics) combine to affect 
group processes, which in turn influence group outputs. 
Following the input-process-output model, this study builds and 
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proposes a theoretical framework for the model of group cognitive 
complexity. The proposed model incorporates the compositional 
(input) and the group-as-a-whole (process) approaches to explain 
group decision-making effectiveness (output). The model specifies 
how group compositions, in terms of cognitive complexities of 
members, affect emergent properties of group cognitive complexity, 
which in turn affect group decision-making effectiveness. 
The present study includes several composition methods (e.g., 
the mean, the variance, and the dominant member) as causes 
for emergent group cognitive complexity. Before presenting the 
theoretical model on group cognitive complexity, the literature on 
cognitive complexity is first reviewed, after which a discussion on 
group conceptualization of cognitive complexity is provided.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Cognitive Complexity
Different individuals have different ways of looking at the social 
world. To understand how individuals construct their social events, 
psychologists have developed the concepts of schemata (Minsky 
1975), frames of reference (Shrivastava and Mitroff 1983), and 
mindscapes (Maruyama 1993). Despite different terminologies, these 
concepts refer to a cognitive structure that represents an organized 
and pre-existing knowledge system that guides in information 
processing (Fiske and Taylor 1991). 
Cognitive complexity represents the complexity in the cognitive 
structure of an individual. Cognitive complexity is defined by two 
primary structural components: differentiation and integration. 
Differentiation refers to the ability to perceive several dimensions in 
a stimulus rather than a single dimension alone, while integration 
refers to the ability to identify multiple relationships among the 
differentiated characteristics (Schroder, Driver, and Streufert 1967). 
Cognitive complexity has been studied as a predictor of human 
functioning in a wide range of areas: predictive accuracy (Bieri 
1955; Crockett 1965), attribution (Streufert and Nogami 1984), 
interpersonal attraction and sociability (Adama-Webber 2001), 
communication (Burleson and Samter 1990), creativity (Quinn 
1980), leadership (Zaccaro 2001), negotiation (Pruitt and Lewis 
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1975), and decision making (Gruenfeld 1995). In particular, with 
the increasing focus on the information-processing and decision-
making perspectives, many researchers have extensively applied the 
concept of cognitive complexity to understand human information-
processing behavior. The concept proposes that people differ in their 
tendency (or ability) to process information according to their level 
of cognitive complexity. Empirical evidence supports this theoretical 
argument. For example, cognitively complex individuals tend to 
search for a broader range of information and use more information 
to reach a conclusion, whereas less complex individuals tend to use 
relatively less information to make a decision (Driver 1987). Other 
studies have further demonstrated that cognitively complex people, 
in contrast to less complex people, interpret information in a multi-
dimensional manner and integrate information more efficiently 
(Schroder, Driver, and Streufert 1967). 
Cognitive complexity is more concerned with the structure of 
cognition than the content of cognition. Accordingly, research on 
cognitive complexity is more interested in the issues of how people 
think or how information is processed (i.e., structure) as opposed 
to what they think or what information is processed (i.e., content). 
This makes cognitive complexity different from other cognitive style 
measures, such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers and 
McCaulley 1985), the Kirton Adaption-Innovation inventory (Kirton 
1976), and the Allinson-Hayes Cognitive Style Index (Allinson and 
Hayes 1996), all of which are content based. The content of what 
information is processed may vary from one activity to the other, 
whereas the structure-related issue of how information is processed 
is less sensitive to a particular activity. Thus, some authors have 
argued that cognitive complexity can be applied to a relatively wide 
range of human activities (Streufert and Swezey 1986).  
Group Conceptualization of Cognitive Complexity
A traditional way of conceptualizing cognitive complexity at the 
group level is the compositional approach, which first targets the 
cognitive complexities of individuals and then assigns them to 
stratified groups according to their levels of cognitive complexity 
(Hendrick 1979; Stager 1967; Stone, Sivitanides, and Magro 1994). 
Although such a conceptualization was widely used, it could not 
reflect group interactive processes during the task performance. In 
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contrast, other scholars supporting the “the existence of collective 
cognition” view group cognitive complexity as an emergent 
product of social interactions among group members (Greunfeld 
and Hollingshead 1993; Streufert and Nogami 1989). From this 
perspective, group cognitive complexity can be more (or less) than 
the sum of the cognitive complexities of the individual group 
members. More specifically, in the course of group interactions, 
although individual group members bring their own perspectives to 
a group, collectively, the group is likely to create something beyond 
the initial individual perspectives. 
The two components of cognitive complexity at the individual level 
(i.e., differentiation and integration) can be applied to conceptualize 
the cognitive complexity construct of a whole group (Gruenfeld 
and Hollingshead 1993; Streufert and Swezey 1986). Although 
the cognition of individuals is not the same as group-based 
interactions among individual members who present ideas for group 
discussion, the concepts of differentiation and integration that 
characterize the information-processing behaviors by individuals 
can be applied to construe the overall group information-processing 
characteristics. These two primary components at the group level 
might be called as group differentiation and group integration. In 
the conceptualization of group cognitive complexity, the concepts 
of group differentiation and group integration can account for 
group interactions (group information processing). Paralleling the 
differentiation at the individual level, group differentiation could be 
defined as a function of the number of differentiated perspectives, 
ideas, or opinions presented by a group (or group members) during 
a group interaction. For example, in dealing with a problem, if a 
group approaches in a unidimentional manner or if group members 
hold a similar perspective, the level of group differentiation is low. In 
contrast, a group can be characterized as cognitively differentiated if 
diverse perspectives are presented by the group (or group members). 
Likewise, paralleling the integration at the individual level, group 
integration could be defined as the extent of conceptual connections 
among the differentiated perspectives presented in a group (or 
among group members). If a group does not have any rules to 
connect the differentiated ideas of its members, or if a group relies 
repeatedly on a pre-established and fixed rule to connect the ideas 
at all times, the group can be described as having a low level of 
group integration. Group differentiation precedes group integration 
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and can be precondition for group integration; however, group 
differentiation itself does not guarantee group integration. For 
example, even if a group holds a variety of perspectives, if the group 
lacks a rule to integrate it, the cognitive structure of the group is 
likely to be fragmented. 
In sum, following the group-as-a-whole perspective, this study 
defines group cognitive complexity in terms of the two components 
of group differentiation and group integration, which reflects group 
interactions. This study also explores how the combinations of 
inputs by individual members (i.e., member cognitive complexities) 
influence group cognitive complexity. The interdependent nature of 
groups often poses interpersonal demands on group members. The 
patterns of group interaction may depend on the characteristics 
of individual members (i.e., what kinds of people in terms of 
demographics, personality, cognitive capability, and cognitive style) 
who belong to a group (Moreland, Levine, and Wingert 1996). In 
a similar vein, it would be reasonable to expect that the cognitive 
complexity of the whole group (i.e., that which emerged from group 
interactions) reflects the cognitive complexities of its individual 
members. To explore the linkages between individual member 
cognitive complexities and the emergent group cognitive complexity, 
this study draws on the analytical frameworks developed by 
the group composition studies: the mean, the variance, and the 
dominant member.  
A THEORETICAL MODEL
The Mean Model
In group composition literature, individual member attributes are 
aggregated to represent a group-level attribute. Different researchers 
have adopted various aggregation methods in their investigations. 
In particular, Steiner’s (1972) task typology provided theoretical 
guidance to group composition researchers for an appropriate choice 
of aggregation. He classified types of tasks according to how the 
contributions of individuals become related to group outcome; that 
is, in terms of additive, conjunctive, disjunctive, and discretionary 
tasks. In additive tasks, each individual member performs the same 
task (e.g., lifting a heavy object). The group outcome is a result of 
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the summative combination of the contributions of all the group 
members, and the average score of member attributes is often 
used as a proper composition method. The use of the minimum 
score is regarded as a proper aggregation method if group tasks are 
conjunctive, particularly, if there is little redundancy in individual 
roles, and group performance is determined by the performance of 
the lowest member (e.g., a production assembly line). The use of the 
maximum score is considered most appropriate for disjunctive tasks, 
wherein group performance is dependent on the most competent 
member of a group (e.g., a math equation problem). Finally, in 
discretionary tasks, group members produce a single solution to 
an issue where the verifiable answer is unknown (e.g., forecasting 
stock prices). The average of the contributions of the individual 
members is suggested as the appropriate aggregation method (Steiner 
1972). However, other methods have also been employed because 
discretionary tasks allow group members to decide how to combine 
members’ contributions as they wish.
Overall, group composition researchers have commonly selected 
an aggregation method in their studies according to Steiner’s task 
types: mean score for additive tasks, minimum score for conjunctive 
tasks, and maximum score for disjunctive tasks. If one intends to 
do a laboratory study that explicitly manipulates the task types, 
Steiner’s typology provides a theoretical basis for the choice of 
aggregation methods. However, as several scholars have pointed out, 
real work groups perform various tasks associated with all the task 
typologies (Argote and McGrath 1993; Goodman 1986). Therefore, it 
is difficult to apply to the choice of aggregation method by Steiner’s 
typology for actual work groups. 
Empirical research investigating the relationships among the three 
aggregation methods has reported that mean score is substantially 
correlated to the minimum and maximum scores (Barrick et al. 
1998; Williams and Sternberg 1988). This finding is reasonable 
because the computation of the mean includes both the minimum 
and the maximum. Moreover, a recent meta-analytic review by 
Devine and Philips (2001) demonstrated that the mean yields a 
higher predictive validity compared with the minimum and the 
maximum score. Day et al. (2004) reported similar findings. In their 
laboratory study, where Steiner’s task types were manipulated, they 
found that the mean is the strongest predictor of group outcome for 
all task types: the mean is significantly stronger than the minimum 
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and the maximum, even for conjunctive and disjunctive tasks, 
respectively. Based on the recent empirical findings, rather than 
the minimum and the maximum, the present study focuses on 
the mean score of member cognitive complexities as a cause for an 
emergent quality of group cognitive complexity.  
The basic assumption of the aggregation by the mean is that as 
the amount of a particular characteristic possessed by individual 
group members increases, the collective pool of that characteristic 
in a group increases. That is, a simple linear relationship is 
postulated between an additive composition of individual member’s 
characteristics and a group-level characteristic. 
This simple linear model has guided early cognitive complexity 
researchers to assume that group-level cognitive complexity 
increases proportionately to the level of cognitive complexity of 
individual members in a group (e.g., Hendrick 1979; Stager 1967). 
Hendrick’s (1979) study provided a typical example of the mean 
model. In his laboratory study, Hendrick measured the cognitive 
complexity of individual participants and classified them as 
high or low in cognitive complexity for group selection. Next, he 
operationalized group cognitive complexity by stratifying participants 
into two groups based on their scores on cognitive complexity: (1) 
high-cognitive complexity groups, to which individuals obtaining a 
high-cognitive complexity score were assigned and (2) low-cognitive 
complexity groups, to which individuals obtaining a low-cognitive 
complexity score were assigned. He found that less complex 
groups (composed of individuals with low cognitive complexity) 
took approximately twice as long as complex groups (composed of 
individuals with high cognitive complexity) to successfully complete 
an assigned task. He also found that, compared to less complex 
groups, complex group members demonstrated better cue utilization 
(e.g., more sensitivity to minimal cues and better ability to use them 
appropriately) and interacted at a faster pace.  
The mean model assumes that group cognitive complexity is 
simply the sum of individual member cognitive complexities; 
however, this assumption might be wrong because group cognitive 
complexity is more (or less) than the sum. The group cognitive 
complexity phenomenon could be better understood if group 
interactions produced by group members who possess different (or 
similar) cognitive structure are taken into account. A certain group 
composition in terms of member cognitive complexities may, to 
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some extent, explain the group cognitive complexity phenomenon; 
however, this is not sufficient to explain the phenomenon. 
Based on this argument, the two constructs (average of member 
cognitive complexities versus group cognitive complexity), which 
previous research has treated as the same construct, need to 
be distinguished, and the relationship between them should be 
investigated. To re-specify the relationships, the present study 
proposes the average of member cognitive complexities as a cause 
for the emergence of group cognitive complexity. For example, in a 
group composed of cognitively complex individuals, group members 
will be more likely to search for more alternatives and be able to 
integrate them. Thus, the group as a whole is likely to have a larger 
collective pool of generated alternatives and be able to synthesize 
them through extensive evaluations (i.e., high-group cognitive 
complexity). On the other hand, in a group composed of cognitively 
less complex individuals, the group as a whole is likely to have a 
smaller pool of divergent alternatives and show little integration of 
the alternatives (i.e., low-group cognitive complexity). 
From the mean model discussed earlier, the following proposition 
is derived: 
P1: An average of the cognitive complexities of individual 
members in a group will be positively related to the cognitive 
complexity of a whole group
The Variance Model
Although the mean model represents a unique feature of group 
composition characteristics, at the same time, it provides limited 
information by simply combining group members’ individual 
attributes in an additive manner. In cases wherein interpersonal 
demands in groups occur, a relatively notable characteristic of some 
members could be balanced out by the opposite characteristics 
of others (Barrick et al. 1998). In some cases, this difference may 
create a new group-level characteristic that is masked by the mean. 
As such, several composition researchers have shown interest in the 
issue of how certain distributions of a given characteristics within a 
group are related to group processes and outcomes (Haythorn 1968; 
Milliken and Martins 1996). The variance model is concerned with 
the degree of homogeneity (or heterogeneity) of the individual scores 
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of group members for a particular characteristic, and then examines 
whether homogeneous groups behave differently compared with 
heterogeneous groups. 
Intuitively, compared with the mean model, variance compositions 
may generate different patterns of group interactions and group 
cognitive structure. For a more complete understanding of the 
relationships between member cognitive complexities and emerging 
group cognitive complexity, the variance model seems an intriguing 
issue and worthy of investigation. However, there have been 
few studies on the variance compositions of member cognitive 
complexities. While there have been a few exceptions (i.e., Stager 
1967; Tuckman 1967), even those studies did not directly address 
the question of how homogeneity (or heterogeneity) of member 
cognitive complexities leads to a certain shape of group cognitive 
structure.
In general, studies on group heterogeneity of a particular trait, 
based on different theoretical frameworks, have reported mixed 
findings (Milliken and Martins 1996; Williams and O’Reilly 1998). 
For example, the social categorization perspective proposes negative 
effects of group heterogeneity on group function (Berscheid and 
Walster 1978). According to the theory, interpersonal attraction and 
liking are determined by the extent to which a member perceives 
himself or herself to be similar or dissimilar to others. If a member 
feels dissimilar to others, he or she is less likely to interact and 
share experience with those dissimilar to him or her, thus resulting 
in unfavorable group function.
In contrast, the information-processing/decision-making 
perspective (Knippenberg, De Dreu, and Homan 2004) provides a 
theoretical foundation for the positive effects of group heterogeneity. 
According to this perspective, the positive effects of diversity are 
associated with differences in information (or viewpoints and 
ideas) among group members. Heterogeneous groups are more 
likely to process a broader range of information and examine more 
alternative ideas, thus resulting in effective group function. 
Although the issues of whether group heterogeneity (diversity) 
has positive or negative effects on group processes and group 
outcomes are inconclusive and still challenge organizational 
scholars, a number of scholars have proposed different effects of 
diversity according to a composition variable (Milliken and Martins 
1996; Williams and O’Reilly 1998). For example, readily observable 
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attributes such as sex, age, and ethnicity are likely to evoke social 
categorization processes in groups and produce problematic 
relations between dissimilar members. Thus, group heterogeneity 
of such attributes is proposed to have a negative effect on group 
function. On the other hand, less-visible underlying attributes such 
as task-related knowledge, values, beliefs, and cognitive bases are 
linked often to differences in information, opinions, and viewpoints 
among group members, and this informational diversity is proposed 
to have beneficial effects on groups. 
As cognitive complexity is not a visible attribute and is related 
to an individual difference variable in information processing, it is 
expected to be associated with informational diversity. Therefore, 
drawing on the information-processing/decision-making perspective, 
this study proposes that the heterogeneity of member cognitive 
complexities will increase group cognitive complexity. For example, 
in heterogeneous groups composed of individuals with varying 
levels of cognitive complexity, differences in ways of information 
processing among members may give rise to diverse information 
and perspectives in groups. Faced with diverse information and 
perspectives, a group as a whole creates a more differentiated 
cognitive structure. In addition, group members may engage in 
more elaborate information processing to reconcile the different 
perspectives than would be the case in the absence of diverse 
information. 
 However, it should be noted that too much diversity might disrupt 
group processes. Specifically, some researchers have suggested a 
curvilinear relationship between diversity and group effectiveness 
(i.e., an inverted U-shape) (Knippenberg, De Dreu, and Homan 2004; 
Williams and O’Reilly 1998). Diversity up to an optimal level may 
beneficial to groups; however, diversity beyond this level may be 
detrimental to groups. Following this line of reasoning, it is expected 
that a group composed entirely of members with high cognitive 
complexity may suffer from too much information because each 
highly complex member may bring a great amount of information 
to the group. Therefore, inclusion of some high-cognitive complexity 
members will be helpful, but too many high-cognitive complexity 
members will impair effective development of group cognitive 
complexity. Given the discussion above, the following proposition is 
derived:
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P2: The variability in the individual cognitive complexity 
of group members will be positively related to the cognitive 
complexity of a whole group. 
The Dominant Member Model
In the mean and the variance models, each member is assumed to 
contribute equally to the development of group cognitive structure, 
regardless of individual status differences in groups. However, group 
discussion is often dominated by high-status members (Earley 1999; 
Walsh, Henderson, and Deighton 1988). The consideration of status 
differences addresses not simply who is in the group but also how 
members function within the group (Ancona and Caldwell 1998). 
Members in a group do not influence group works equally. In real 
work groups, some members could dominate group discussion, 
whereas other members may simply comply with the dominant 
member. Over the life of a group, differentiated status or prestige 
emerges among group members (Berger and Zelditch 1998). 
Members who are highly regarded relative to others are likely to 
acquire high status in a group. Research has reported several 
personal characteristics associated with status differences among 
group members: leadership, facilitation ability, assertiveness, 
knowledge competence, or activeness as members, among others (see 
Ancona and Caldwell 1998; Levin and Moreland 1990, for a review).
The social influence literature suggests that the patterns of inter-
member relationships are formed by status systems (Levine and 
Moreland 1990). For example, members of high status are more 
likely to speak and be frequently spoken to, criticize, and interrupt 
others (Skvoretz 1988). Similarly, research on social cognition 
suggests that high-status members make larger contributions to the 
formation of group cognition compared with lower-status members 
(Earley 1999; Ginsberg 1990; Walsh and Fahey 1986). In his study 
on group efficacy, Earley (1999) found that a high-status member 
plays a significant role in the formation of group efficacy belief. In 
particular, a higher-status member is likely to set expectations for 
the groups, while lower-status group members are likely to follow 
the lead of the high-status member. 
Other scholars have also noted that a high-status member can 
serve a crucial function in guiding group members to exchange 
and evaluate information during group discussion. Gersick (1988) 
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suggested that high-status members often take greater initiative in 
facilitating information-gathering activities, interpreting information, 
and resolving disagreements or redirecting group members to 
process information. Moreover, status may serve a weighting 
function. Gibson (2003) argued that the information (opinions) 
suggested by high-status members is more likely to be emphasized 
during group discussion. Thus, during group interactions, the 
contributions of high-status members may be weighed more heavily 
compared with lower-status members.
Drawing on social influence literature, the present study proposes 
that the cognitive complexity of the dominant member who exerts 
the strongest influence on the other members in a group affects 
the development of the cognitive complexity of the whole group. 
For example, if one member dominates group decision making, 
the group cognitive structure may be highly influenced by the 
cognitive system of that member. In contrast, other members who 
simply endorse the opinions held by the dominant member may 
not contribute to the group cognitive structure, and their cognitive 
system may not exist in the group cognitive structure despite their 
presence during group discussions. 
P3: The level of cognitive complexity of the dominant member of 
a group will be positively related to the cognitive complexity of a 
whole group. 
It should be noted that propositions 1, 2, and 3 are somewhat 
inconsistent with one another. Specifically, the mean model implies 
that the more highly complex the members in a group, the higher 
the group cognitive complexity (proposition 1), while the variance 
approach maintains that the greater the varying levels of cognitive 
complexity among members, the higher the group cognitive 
complexity (proposition 2). In addition, if a single dominant member 
determines the level of group cognitive complexity (proposition 3), 
either the mean or the variance model would not be feasible. In spite 
of the incompatible nature of the different composition methods, 
each method may account for an independent source of composition 
effects. Group compositions are multifaceted. There are many 
different patterns possible, even for a single composition variable 
(McGrath 1998). Thus, one single composition method is limited, 
covering only narrow aspects of composition. Although the mean, 
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the variance, and the dominant models are somewhat incompatible, 
each has a different theoretical rationale. In addition, the use of 
multiple methods may provide a more complete understanding 
of how the cognitive complexities of members lead to emergent 
properties of group cognitive complexity. 
Group Cognitive Complexity and Group Decision-Making Effectiveness
Effective decision making cannot be accomplished with insufficient 
information. Scholars have argued that the quality of a decision is a 
function of the number of alternatives available in decision-making 
contexts (e.g., Kiesler and Spoull 1982). The “Law of Requisite 
Variety” formulated by Ashby (1956) supports the argument. The 
law of requisite variety maintains that the requisite variety of a 
system must match the variety or complexity of its environment. 
In other words, in order to survive, a system (e.g., an individual or 
group) confronted with a complex decision-making situation must 
employ a corresponding variety in its responses. A system with 
inadequate requisite variety incorporates a limited set of responses. 
Thus, it is unable to react to a situation effectively.
Cognitive structure guides information-processing activities by 
filtering information from environmental stimuli, organizing and 
integrating certain aspects of stimuli, and adapting to situational 
constraints (Schneier 1977). Since the concept of cognitive 
complexity represents the complexity of cognitive structure, 
cognitive complexity is applied to understand how a system deals 
with information-processing behavior and its consequences (Streufert 
and Swezey 1986). Cognitive complexity has been found to relate 
to individual differences in information-processing style and 
resulting in the differences in task performance across individuals. 
The central idea in cognitive complexity theory is that individuals 
differ in information-seeking behaviors while performing cognitive 
activities (e.g., decision making, problem solving, and planning), 
which are primarily based on their levels of cognitive complexity 
(Driver 1987). As stated previously, the theory considers the two 
structural components (i.e., differentiation and integration) that 
underlie the flow, processing, and utilization of information. More 
specifically, in a given situation, cognitively complex decision-
makers tend to approach an issue in a multi-dimensional way 
and employ considerably more information compared with less 
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complex decision-makers. Complex decision-makers are also able to 
synthesize the relationship of diverse information. Furthermore, the 
concepts of differentiation and integration have been found to relate 
to effective decision making. Specifically, in addition to employing a 
wide range of information, complex decision-makers are more likely 
to make a more thorough and balanced consideration of the relevant 
information compared with less complex decision-makers, thus 
reducing the risk of bias, which in turn results in a better decision 
(Gruenfeld and Hollingshead 1993). 
Most studies investigating the effects of cognitive complexity 
on task performance were conducted at the individual level (e.g., 
Hendrick 1979; Stager 1967; Stone, Sivitanidee, and Magro 1994). 
However, similar principles may work at the group-level. Based 
on the general system theory (Miller 1965), cognitive complexity 
researchers regard individuals, groups, and organizations as 
information-processing systems that possess certain general 
characteristics in common (Driver and Streufert 1969; Streufert 
and Swezey 1986). They view individuals and groups as having 
certain basic similarities in information processing (e.g., searching, 
analyzing, and organizing information) based on their levels of 
cognitive complexity. Therefore, both are expected to respond to 
their environments in a similar fashion. Extending the research at 
the individual level, the present study proposes the following:
P4: The cognitive complexity of a whole group will be positively 
related to group decision-making effectiveness.  
Figure 1 summarizes the proposed model of this study. Based on 
a system model of group, input-process-output, the present study 
elaborates the relationships between group compositions of member 
cognitive complexities, an emergent property of group cognitive 
complexity, and group decision-making effectiveness. Following 
a group-as-a-whole perspective, the present study defines group 
cognitive complexity as an emergent property resulting from social 
interactions among group members. The group compositions (i.e., 
the mean, the variance, and the dominant member) are derived from 
the compositional perspective and included as the input variables 
in the model. The proposed model also contains the relationship 
between the emergent group cognitive complexity and group 
decision-making effectiveness. Although some empirical works have 
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suggested the significant effects of group composition on group 
performance (Hendrick 1979; Stager 1967), they neglect a theoretical 
explanation for such effects. The inclusion of the emergent group 
cognitive complexity in the proposed model may provide an 
intervening mechanism between the composition characteristics and 
group decision-making effectiveness.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
A critical step in empirically studying “collective cognition” in 
groups is to develop sound measures. The idea that individuals in 
groups interact with one another and produce a collective cognition 
that is qualitatively different from the sum of the individual 
cognitions is quite compelling. However, little empirical work has 
demonstrated group cognition as a property of working groups as 
whole. According to some scholars, the primary reason for this is 
that the conceptualization of collective cognition generally requires 
the invention of a new measure to capture cognitive and social 
interactions among group members (Greunfeld and Hollingshead 
1993). This study therefore suggests a causal mapping combined 
with a group discussion method, which is a useful tool to measure 
group cognitive complexity as a collective phenomenon.
’
’
Figure 1. The Proposed Model of Group Cognitive Complexity
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Causal Maps for Measuring Cognitive Complexity
Several researchers have developed different measurements 
of cognitive complexity (see Streufert and Swezey 1986, for a 
review of various cognitive complexity measures). Among the 
existing measurement methods, this study focuses on causal 
mapping techniques as appropriate ways to measure emergent 
qualities of group cognitive complexity, as well as individual 
cognitive complexity. First, causal maps reflect well the theoretical 
conceptualizations of cognitive complexity. While some cognitive 
complexity measures (e.g., Role Construct Repertory Test; Bieri 
1955) focus on only differentiation, causal mapping is able to provide 
the measures of both differentiation and integration. Second, casual 
mapping enables to obtain cognitive complexity scores, both at the 
individual and group level (as an emergent group property) via the 
same procedure. Third, causal mapping provides highly structured 
elicitation procedures common to each individual. Therefore, it can 
facilitate, not only aggregation of individual cognitive complexities, 
but also comparisons between aggregated cognitive complexities and 
emergent group cognitive complexities.
Causal maps were developed to capture mental models for 
individuals with regard to a particular domain (Huff 1990; Eden and 
Ackermann 1992; Narayanan and Armstrong 2005). A causal map 
consists of concepts and causal relations (cause and effect) that an 
individual uses to understand a given issue (e.g., causal belief about 
important aspects of organizational success). 
Causal maps are expressed in the form of a network of causal 
relations. In a graphical diagram, they involve nodes that indicate 
concepts (factors or variables) and arrows that indicate causal 
relationships between nodes. For example, if a person perceives that 
A is a cause of B, the relationship between the two concepts are 
represented as an arrow originating from A and pointing to B (A→B). 
Scholars in organizational cognition focus on the structural 
properties of causal maps to measure cognitive complexity (Calori, 
Johnson, and Sarnin 1994; Carley and Palmquist 1992); that 
is, the number of nodes and links reflects the complexity of a 
map. Comprehensiveness and density measures from the social 
network field are applied to measure the cognitive complexity of 
an individual (or a group). Comprehensiveness is a measure of the 
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number of nodes in a causal map. This measure highlights the level 
of differentiation of a map; specifically, the more comprehensive 
the map (the more nodes in a map), the higher the differentiated 
cognitive structure of a cognitive system. On the other hand, 
density can be used for the measure of integration (i.e., how much 
the concepts in a map are connected). Density is calculated as the 
number of links between nodes divided by the number of nodes in a 
map. 
On the assumption that the more comprehensive and denser 
the map, the higher is its level of cognitive complexity, researchers 
have combined comprehensiveness and density scores to measure 
cognitive complexity. There are at least two composite measures of 
cognitive complexity used in previous works on causal mapping: (1) 
a multiplication of the comprehensiveness score by density (i.e., the 
number of nodes x [the number of links/the number of node]) (Calori, 
Johnson, and Sarnin 1994), and (2) an average of the standardized 
scores of comprehensiveness and density (Nadkarni and Narayanan 
2005).
Group Discussion Method
Group property, as a whole, does not emerge from the 
characteristics of individual members (Klein and Kozlowski 2000). 
Often, group researchers have difficulty obtaining an appropriate 
global measure of group-level constructs. In the past, many group 
researchers relied on aggregate measures of individual data to 
represent a group-level phenomenon. However, recent research 
suggests a promising avenue for measurement of a group property 
as a whole through a group discussion method. 
Group discussion method has a unique advantage in satisfying 
the criteria outlined by Bar-tal (1990). Bar-tal suggested that a 
group-level construct must reflect the group as a whole, rather than 
individual members as separate units, and that the origin of the 
construct must reflect the processes of interaction within the group 
to best represent an attribute of the group. Several researchers have 
incorporated Bar-tal’s recommendation in their studies (Gibson 
1999; Gibson, Randel, and Early 2000). For example, in Gibson’s 
(1999) study on group efficacy, a group was given one copy of a 
questionnaire and was asked to derive a single collective estimate of 
group efficacy through group discussion. However, as some scholars 
have pointed out, the group discussion method may be vulnerable 
to social desirability influence, and a group-level construct 
measured using the method is thus distorted (Earley 1999). For 
example, when a member has an inordinate power over other 
members, the estimate by the group eventually depends on that 
single member’s personal judgment. Nonetheless, this distortion 
(resulting from status differences among members) may not be an 
actual distortion of reality because group interactions often result in 
disproportionate influence of one member over others (Earley 1999). 
Therefore, a group discussion method that allows group members to 
interact with one another, similar to what may really occur in their 
everyday tasks, may identify a more realistic nature of a group-level 
phenomenon. 
The use of a group discussion method can be applied to elicit 
group causal maps. For example, when group members are asked to 
produce a single collective causal belief of their group (e.g., regarding 
important aspects of organizational success), the open discussion 
method allows interactions among members, and may capture how 
a collective cognitive structure arises, which is consistent with the 
group conceptualization of cognitive complexity in this study.
CONCLUSIONS
The present study attempts to integrate two different perspectives 
on group-level cognitive complexity based on the input-process-
output model (Hackman 1987). The study explored several aspects 
of group composition as a cause for an emergent property of group 
cognitive complexity, which in turn affects group decision-making 
effectiveness. Although past studies have addressed the direct 
effects of a certain group composition on group effectiveness, they 
have largely neglected group interactions (e.g., what is going on 
with group members having similar or dissimilar attributes). The 
study includes group cognitive complexity, which is conceptualized 
as an emergent quality resulting from group interaction, in the 
linkage between group composition and group decision-making 
effectiveness. This inclusion may help more accurately theorize 
the underlying mechanism of how group composition affects group 
outcomes. For the conclusion, this paper discusses the future 
research directions of group cognitive complexity, including its 
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managerial implications.
Future Research Directions
The first issue to confront in group cognitive complexity research 
stems from the infancy of this research area in organizational 
behavior. To progress, basic questions regarding the nature, 
causes, and consequences of group cognitive complexity need 
to be investigated empirically. The proposed model in this study 
may provide a theoretical basis for such studies. In particular, as 
discussed previously, the use of causal mapping combined with 
a group discussion method may help to capture group cognitive 
complexity reflecting group interactions and contribute to an 
empirical verification of the concept of “the collective mind.”
Several scholars in managerial and organizational cognition have 
paid increasing attention to group cognition from the group as a 
whole. However, little is known regarding the factors influencing the 
emergence of group cognition. In this study, in an attempt to link 
group compositions and emergent group cognition, the cognitive 
inputs from individual members are explored as causes of group 
cognitive complexity. Additionally, research is needed to investigate 
other possible antecedents for emergent qualities of group cognitive 
complexity. Although beyond the scope of this paper, some aspects 
of group processes can be a major cause of group cognitive 
complexity. For example, the degree of cognitive overlap (i.e., group 
cognitive diversity explained by Kilduff, Angelmar, and Mehra 
2000) among individual members may affect the complexity of 
cognitive structure of a group as a whole. In addition, information 
sharing may affect the development of group cognitive complexity, 
independently of member cognitive complexities. Specifically, 
group differentiation and group integration (i.e., group cognitive 
complexity) may depend on the extent to which group members 
exchange information with one another. When they rarely do so, 
group processes reduce the amount of available information, and the 
group as a whole might not be able to utilize the potential available 
information fully during the group interaction. This may result in 
reduced group differentiation. Information sharing in groups also 
affects group integration. If group members fully share their ideas 
and perspectives, they are likely to maximize their potential to 
synthesize multiple perspectives. However, when group members do 
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not share perspectives (or ideas) with one another, they are likely to 
reduce their potential to integrate different perspectives.
The present paper argues that the variability in member cognitive 
complexities is positively related to the cognitive complexity of a 
whole group. However, one important issue still remains to be 
addressed: how much variability is optimal? Research on variability 
in member abilities suggests inconclusive findings. One group 
of researchers suggested that large variations in group-member 
ability had detrimental effects on group performance because of 
the frustration it creates between members of different ability 
levels (Secord and Backman 1974). In contrast, another group of 
researchers offered a possible explanation for why variability in 
member abilities positively affects group function. According to the 
social compensation effects (Williams and Karau 1991), capable 
group members were likely to produce more ideas and exert more 
effort than they would have done individually to compensate for 
the weaker members of the group. Taken together, one may argue 
that the frustration effects may surpass the social compensation 
effects when group members are very dissimilar in their cognitive 
complexities. Thus, moderate variability in member cognitive 
complexities may lead to more effective group cognitive complexity. 
The issue of how much variability in member cognitive complexities 
is optimal for group cognitive complexity is intriguing and worthy of 
investigation. 
The proposed relationships between group cognitive complexity 
and group decision-making effectiveness could be elaborated 
by considering a contextual factor. For example, the degree of 
complexity involved during group tasks may alter the strength of 
the relationships between group cognitive complexity and group 
decision-making effectiveness. Several theorists have proposed that 
task complexity play a moderating role in the effects of cognitive 
complexity on behavioral performance (Driver and Streufert 1969; 
Schroder, Driver, and Streufert 1967; Streufert and Swezey 1986). 
They found that when the tasks are simple (e.g., individuals rely 
on a standard operating procedure in performing their tasks) 
or extremely complex (e.g., turbulent environments exceed the 
cognitive capacity of individuals), the differences in performance 
between high and low cognitive complexities are not significant. In 
contrast, at the medium level of task complexity, the differences 
between high and low cognitive complexities are manifested. In 
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this level, cognitively complex individuals perform much better 
compared with less complex individuals. Although the moderating 
effects of task complexity largely have been found on individual-level 
research, similar effects can be expected to the group-level. Thus, 
further studies on the moderating role of task complexity will extend 
understanding of the nature of the relationships between group 
cognitive complexity and group decision-making effectiveness. 
Managerial Implications
If empirical studies demonstrate that a certain aspect of group 
compositions positively influences group cognitive complexity, which 
in turn positively affect group decision-making effectiveness, then 
team selection, team design, and team training can be developed. 
Group composition has frequently been studied as a team design 
variable. One pragmatic desire in this area is to create more effective 
work groups by selecting people with particular traits. However, past 
studies on group composition have largely focused on individual 
differences measure to predict group outcomes. The mismatch at 
the level of analysis might mislead the readers and practitioners. 
Team selection requires considering not only attributes of group 
members, but also team-level properties (Barry and Stewart 1997; 
Neuman and Wright 1999). Since the present study explores group 
decision-making effectiveness using both the individual-level and the 
emergent group-level attributes, it may be relevant to the practice of 
team design. 
Another practical implication for managers concerns team 
training. Research suggests that mental modeling by individuals 
or groups can be taught and developed over time (Fiol 1994). In 
this sense, a team (group) as a whole is encouraged to utilize the 
concepts of cognitive complexity in decision-making contexts. The 
cognitive mapping technique may also offer relevant materials on 
team training processing, which could assist in team learning over 
time. For example, once group causal maps are identified, group 
members can review these with managers or other pertinent staff for 
possible growth. 
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